发布时间 : 星期一 文章案例更新完毕开始阅读
to prevent government practices which evade the tariff obligations.
Article III is the central national treatment obligation of General Agreement, which establishes the general principle that internal taxes and regulations “should not be applied… so as to afford protection to domestic production.”
第六章 自然人
【案例6.1】荷兰公民马克行为能力确认案。荷兰籍男青年马克，21岁，1997年来中国旅游，在某风景区一户少数民族农家，看中一套当地人的民族服装。经协商，以随身携带的照相机与之互易。马克打电话给好友，告知此事。其朋友称这笔交易不合算，劝马克把照相机换回来，马克回到农家商谈返还之事，农家不同意。马克遂以自己时年不满23岁，按其本国法（荷兰法律规定23岁为成年年龄）尚未成年，不具有完全民事行为能力，所为民事行为无效为由，诉至我国法院。
本案涉及涉外案件中自然人行为能力的法律适用问题。根据最高人民法院《关于贯彻执行＜中华人民共和国民法通则＞若干问题的意见（试行）》第180条的规定，马克的行为能力应适用行为地，即中国的法律来认定。马克现年21岁，按中国法律年满18周岁的正常人为完全民事行为能力人，马克具有完全民事行为能力，不得主张合同无效。
【思考题】
1. 中国法院对下列案例是否有管辖权？有管辖权的法院应适用何国法律？
16
【案例6.2】丈夫国外打工期间妻子申请宣告其死亡案
北京石景山居民杨永平指控妻子王梅为达到重婚目的，恶意向法院申请宣布在日本打工的自己死亡，因此他将王梅告上法庭，请求法院追究王梅重婚的刑事责任。石景山区人民法院受理了这桩离奇的自诉重婚案。
杨永平介绍，1993年11月1日，他与王梅自由恋爱结婚。婚后不久，他被单位派往日本研修2年。在日期间，妻子王梅多次来信，劝说他为了将来的前途留在日本。于是，在学习期满后，离开研修单位的他滞留在日本，开始了打工生活。
在日打工期间，杨永平先后给国内的王梅汇款800万日元(约合人民币56万元)。2001年起，王梅态度大变，说不认识杨永平，要杨永平不要再骚扰她。2002年，杨永平被日本政府以非法滞留的名义遣返回国。回国后，王梅对杨永平避而不见。2003年年底，在杨永平的要求下，法院判决两人离婚， 1516
15
参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第125－126页。 参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第123—124页。
并确认了“婚前财产归杨永平所有，王梅还需给付杨永平23万元”的财产处理方式。
王梅不服判决提出上诉，声称她早以杨永平下落不明为由，向法院申请宣告杨永平死亡。2002年12月，法院经过公告寻人无线索已经宣告杨永平死亡。2003年3月，王梅又与他人登记结婚，因此不存在离婚一说，要求撤销这一判决。
获悉自己曾经“死去”的情况后，杨永平大怒。他再次走进法院，指控王梅在婚姻关系存续期间，故意隐瞒事实真相，恶意宣告他死亡，以达到重婚目的，其行为已涉嫌重婚罪，请求法院撤销对自己的死亡宣告，追究王梅的刑事责任，并要求赔偿损失10万元。
2004年12月15日，石景山区人民法院因考虑到王梅尚在哺乳期内，故判处王梅拘役6个月，缓刑1年，同时判决王梅与他人的婚姻无效。 2.同样是解决国籍冲突，国际私法与国际公法有何不同？ 3.简述住所与国籍、居所和惯常居所在法律上的区别？ 4.简述自然人权利能力法律适用的主要做法。
5.为什么在某种情况下需要采用行为地法来判定自然人的行为能力？ 6.如何处理连接点改变后的自然人行为能力的问题？
【扩展性阅读材料】
1．刘益灯：《惯常居所：属人法趋同化的必然选择》，《中南工业大学学报（社会科学版）》，2002年第3期。 2．Habitual residence17
This connecting factor has been employed in several statutes, some of which are based upon international conventions which employ the term either in addition to, or in place of, domicile.Thus, it is used as an alternative to domicile in respect of the jurisdiction of the English courts to grant decrees of divorce, judicial separation and nullity of marriage, and in respect of the law governing the formal validity of wills. It is used as an alternative to domicile and nationality as a basis for the jurisdiction of a foreign court when recognition of an overseas divorce is in issue. It has relevance in the choice of law rules for contract and plays a part in the laws of taxation, immigration and social security.
In Cruse v. Chittun, an early case which concerned the recognition of an overseas divorce, habitual residence was said to denote “regular physical presence which must endure for some time”. In several cases, the courts have said that it is a question of fact; this has turned out to be over-optimistic and, unavoidably, perhaps, legal rules have developed.
Some principles were stated by Lord Brandon in the leading case. Habitual residence must be understood in the natural and ordinary meaning of those words and is a question of fact to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case. Unlike domicile, it cannot be acquired in a single day, since “appreciable period of 17
J. G. Collier, Conflict of Laws, Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2001, pp.55-57.
time and a settled intention to reside on a long-term basis” are necessary. The “settled intention” need not be an intention to stay in the country permanently or indefinitely. Like domicile, it is immediately lost by leaving a country with a settled intention not to return.
Although in several cases, habitual residence has been said to differ not at all from ordinary residence, there are at least two differences between them. A person can have only one habitual residence but may have more than one ordinary residence at any one time. Whereas ordinary residence can be acquired in a single day, habitual residence needs an appreciable period of time.
Habitual residence differs from domicile in several respects. It is not ascribed to a person at birth; the intention required for its acquisition is different and a previous habitual residence does not revive on the abandonment of one which has been subsequently acquired. It is, however, abandoned in the same way as domicile is abandoned. Therefore, a person can be without a habitual residence.
As regards the habitual residence of children, the fact that a child may be without one may deprive him or her of the protection of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 if he or she is aducted. Most of the reported cases about habitual residence have been decided under this Act. The courts have held that a child’s habitual residence may change with that of parent with whom the child lives and who is exercising rights of custody. If the parents live together and the child lives with then, he or she has their habitual residence. If they have joint responsibility, neither can change the child’s habitual residence by wrongfully removing or retainting the child in breach of the other party’s rights. Both parents must consent. A court order may change the child’s habitual residence. If one parent has lawful custody his or her habitual residence is also that of the child. If the child is made a ward of court, the court’s consent is needed to change the child’s habitual residence. This habitual residence “of dependence”, like that of domicile, probably ceases at the age of sixteen.